Case 2:20-cr-00035-JAM Document 36 Filed 04/26/21 Page 1 of 4

1 2 3 4 5	PHILLIP A. TALBERT Acting United States Attorney JAMES R. CONOLLY Assistant United States Attorney 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900		
6 7	Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America		
8			
9	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
10	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 2:20-CR-35-JAM	
12	Plaintiff,	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE	
13	v.	TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER	
14	OBDULIO JIMÉNEZ, DANIEL JOE BOBIAN,	DATE: April 27, 2021	
15	JOSE MANUEL AGUILERA BARBOSA,	TIME: 9:30 a.m. COURT: Hon. John A. Mendez	
16	Defendants.		
17			
18	By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 27, 2021. By this stipulation and		
19	proposed order, the parties respectfully request that the Court continue the status conference until		
20	June 8, 2021. To the extent it is needed, this stipulation supplements the basis for exclusion of time		
21	under the Court's General Orders addressing public health concerns, and requests that the Court also		
22	exclude time between April 27, 2021, and June 8, 2021, under Local Code T4, for the reasons set forth		
23	below.		
24	Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has		
25	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive		
26	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.		
27	Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no		
28	exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). <i>Id.</i> at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. <i>Id.</i> at		

Case 2:20-cr-00035-JAM Document 36 Filed 04/26/21 Page 2 of 4

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). ¹ The parties note that the Court has already designated a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

///

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

1

2

4 5

67

8

10 11

12

13 14

15

16 17

18

19 20

21

2223

24

25

2627

28 | /

///

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Obdulio JIMÉNEZ and Daniel Joe BOBIAN, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. The undersigned defendants now move to exclude time between April 27, 2021, and June 8, 2021, per Local Code T4, in addition to the exclusion of time the Court has already ordered in light of public health concerns cited by General Orders. Defendant Jose Manuel Aguilera BARBOSA has not yet appeared in this matter, and therefore does not join in this stipulation.
 - 2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The government has produced 100 pages of discovery associated with this case, includes law enforcement reports, photographs, and investigative reports. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel or made available for inspection and copying.
 - b) Counsel for defendants need further time to consult with their clients, review discovery, investigate evidence and potential defense strategies, and otherwise prepare for trial.
 - c) Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
 - d) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
 - f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 27, 2021 to June 8, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Case 2:20-cr-00035-JAM Document 36 Filed 04/26/21 Page 4 of 4

1	3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the		
2	Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial		
3	must commence.		
4	IT IS SO STIPULATED.		
5	Dated: April 23, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT		
6	Acting United States Attorney		
7	/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY JAMES R. CONOLLY		
	Assistant United States Attorney		
8	Dote de Amril 22, 2021		
9	Dated: April 23, 2021 /s/ JENNIFER MOUZIS JENNIFER MOUZIS		
10	Counsel for Defendant		
11	DANIEL JOE BOBIAN		
12	Dated: April 23, 2021 /s/ STEFAN E. SACKS		
	STEFAN E. SACKS		
13	Counsel for Defendant		
14	OBDULIO JIMÉNEZ		
15			
16			
17	FINDINGS AND ORDER		
18	IT IS SO FOLIND AND ODDEDED this 22td day of April 2021		
19			
	/s/ John A. Mendez		
20	THE HONORABLE JOHN A. MENDEZ		
21	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			